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'One year on - from the weather and the sea you would never guess that 
anything had happened'. Such was Christopher Bellamy's recent observation from 
aboard HMS Sheffield for The Independent about the ecological condition of the 
waters of the Persian Gulf a year after Operation Desert Storm1 • Considering the high 
media profile afforded to oil-smeared cormorants on glooming Saudi beaches, to 
blazing Kuwaiti oil-wells and to what was portrayed at the time as an ecological disaster 
of almost apocalyptic proportions, such an observation merely highlights the degree to 
which television audiences worldwide were bombarded with propaganda during the 
GulfWarof 1991. 
The proximity of the event, combined with the paucity of official information 
yet available as to what precisely was going on, would normally deter the historian from 
making anything but the most tentative conclusions about the Gulf War. But because, 
in a sense, the media were the story of this war, do we really have to wait 30 years before 
we can begin to contextualise the phenomenon of the Gulf War as Media Event?2• 
Communications technology has, after all, changed the temporal dimensions of news 
and information. Thanks, for example, to the twin arrival of accessible satellite 
communications and domestic video-recorders, the historian now has unprecedented 
access to a brave new world of television output as evidence that, sooner or later, will 
require the application and perhaps adaptation of the historical method that we have 
been developing for film sources for more than thirty years3• 
It is important, however, to recognise right at the outset of any near 
contemporaneous investigation that there were essentially two wars going on: the war 
itself, fought by the coalition's combined military forces against the regime of Saddam 
Hussein, and the war as portrayed by the media - and that the latter did not necessarily 
reflect the reality of the former. It will only be possible to analyse the 'real war' once 
the official documents are opened, although some details have been emerging gradually 
to alter here and fine tune there the veracity of the media record that was projected at the 
time4• Wartime exaggerations transmitted in 'real time' are already beginning to be 
contextualised with the benefits of consideration and deliberation at first denied by the 
fast-moving media coverage. The oil fires were extinguished within a year and the 
clean-up operation in the Gulf, though clouded in Saudi Arabian secrecy, prevented the 
much vaunted crisis to desalination plants. Besides, the oil spills -because there were 
several of them, not one massive one as presented at the time- were nowhere near as 
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serious as the Exxon Valdez disaster which provided the propagandists with their most 
frequent public point of reference about Saddam Hussein being 'a moral pygmy'5• We 
also now know that the vast majority of bombs dropped on Iraqi forces in Kuwait and 
Iraq were not smart weapons, whose telegenetic images predominated during the war 
itself, but rather conventional 'dumb' bombs whose accuracy was in keeping with their 
historical performance6 • We also now know that it is unlikely that there was as many as 
half a million Iraqi troops in theatre at the time of the 100 Hour Ground War, which may 
help to explain not only why the coalition's forces were so startlingly successful but also 
why comparatively few bodies were seen at the time7• 
But there were other reasons forthe latter. Judgment about the 'reality' of war 
on the small screen has been distorted by the experience of the Vietnam war -the 
exception rather than the rule in terms of media coverage of 20th century conflicts- and 
of its mythologisation afterwards, which influenced the US military in particular. When 
President Bush and his officials talked -as they so often did- of the 'Vietnam Syndrome', 
they were referring as much to the -questionable- belief that the media in general and 
television in particular had lost the United States the war in South East Asia. This time, 
they promised, things would be different - including the introduction of media 
'guidelines' which had more in common with the British tradition of military censorship 
than with the constitutional rights under the First Amendment and the American 'right 
to know'. 
Censorship, that essential counterpart to propaganda, has been present in every 
war of the twentieth century and the evolution of broadcasting traditions concerning 
issues of 'taste' and decency' have added the element of self-censorship on the part of 
journalists and editors themselves. When critics such as John Pilger complained that the 
'real war' was not being seen by audiences around the world', they may have been 
highlighting the existence of a sophisticated coalition censorship and propaganda 
system but they were ignoring the degree to which broadcasters themselves were 
reluctant to offend their audiences by airing many of the 'blood and guts' pictures they 
were able to film - such as from the Amiriya bunker/shelter tragedy in Baghdad on 13 
February 1991 or from the burned out convoy oflraqi troops on the 'Highway to Hell' 
on the road from Kuwait City to Basra at the very end of the waf. 
The arrangements made by both the coalition and the Iraqis for the filming of 
scenes of devastation differed in many respects but the result was the same. As Ian 
Hargreaves, Deputy Editor of the Financial Times, pointed out: 'the public in Britain 
and America will have had the impression that this was a war involving very little death 
and very little utter horror' 10• The Iraqis wanted film of devastated civilian areas to 
penetrate western television in the hope that it would undermine popular support for the 
war. That is why they permitted western journalists, most noticeably from CNN, to 
remain in Baghdad while simultaneously refusing to permit journalists into occupied 
Kuwait. Their emphasis on the issue of 'collateral damage' was a major propaganda 
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theme of the war that the allies countered with their 'video game war'. The coalition, on 
the other hand, understood what the Iraqis did not, namely that western broadcasting 
standards would militate against the showing of 'real war' on screen11: and their media 
newspool arrangements were in fact organised in such a way as to allow the filming of 
graphic material when it was available. Official coalition censorship was confined 
mainly to areas of operational security, religious issues and the sensitivity of relatives 
hack home. The coalition was also helped by the fact that there were comparatively few 
scenes of devastation for the newspools to see. That was the advantage of the air war, 
a notoriously difficult aspect of war forthe media to cover, and of the rapid 'Hail Mary' 
movement into southern Iraq which advanced so quickly that journalists were unable to 
get their reports back to the Forward Tranmission Units which were left far behind of 
the charge until after it was all over - by which time the story had moved on. 
These factors aside, the Gulf War has provided a unique opportunity for the 
historian. Thanks to global satellite communications systems which utilise comparatively 
accessible links between reporter and newsroom- feeds or downlinks- the historian can 
actually compare what is being said at source with what is actually transmitted for public 
consumption. It is the equivalent in filmic terms of having all the out-takes which are 
left on the cutting-room floor and then binned available for scrutiny. Anyone with a 
satellite dish and the appropriate transponders can monitor this and provided the VCR 's 
record button is pressed, it can now be played back, scrutinised, evaluated, verified and 
criticised. It has become a record like any other. As such, however, it has to be treated 
with considerable caution. Apart from being an important source for what has been 
transmitted at a particular moment in time, what is it a record of? How reliable is it as 
a source of information? How and under what conditions was it made? What was the 
purpose of making it? What impact did it have? Historians dealing with this brave new 
world of television as evidence are already familiar with these types of questions. But 
before they and others can deal with television's particular characteristics as an audio-
visual record, they must first understand the medium itself. 
We need, for example, to bear in mind a wide variety of factors which influence 
the text. Television, particularly in the United States, is a consumer industry and, 
especially today, a highly competitive one. It is rooted in certain technologies, the 
creative and cost-effective utilisation of which is vital to its appeal and thus to its 
success. Moreover, television cameras only 'see' what they are pointed at; what goes on 
behind the camera operator's back can only be reported by words and is not part of the 
visual record. The angle of vision is in turn determined by what that operator either can 
point at or which he decrees or hopes will be of interest to his editors. The result is to 
amplify what is before the camera lens and to minimise the significance of what is 
behind it. 
Live television is another aspect of this phenomenon but with different rules 
of operation; there is always the risk that the direct point-to-multipoint communicative 
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process oflive TV, by-passing the editors, will contain images which require explanation 
now denied by the instantaneous nature of the transmission. This can be both exciting 
for audiences and dangerous to authorities wishing to control the context in which the 
images are presented and perceived, as in wartime. During the Gulf War, the race to get 
a story first often meant that television companies became victims of their own 
technology in so far as the normal editorial processes, which involve a cumulative 
application of judgment and context, were being by-passed due to the excitement of the 
event taking place before the camera's angle of vision. With the print media, for 
example, news passes through a series of editorial processes that takes considerably 
longer to reach the audience with the result that the non-visual, what goes on behind the 
camera if you like, is also incorporated to a greater extent than on live television. The 
medium of live television as a vehicle for relating news instantaneously thus assumes 
the potential equally for relating uncontextualised or even false information immediately. 
As well as conveying, uniquely, a sense of involvement and immediacy, it can thus also 
amplify and distort. It might indeed be both a window and a mirror, but television is also 
a flawed microscope. 
A celebrated example of this from the Gulf War came with the media 'scudfest' 
which followed the launching of the first Iraqi AI-Hussein missiles against Israel and 
Saudi Arabia on the second day of the war. Initially dependent on tightly controlled 
coalition media arrangements, the thousand or so journalists who flocked to Riyadh and 
Dharhan were themselves able to feel more directly involved in the war once they were 
able to report frrst hand on what it was like to be near the receiving end of an incoming 
Scud missile. The reports and pictures they were able to file, in other words, provided 
them with an opportunity to describe war for themselves rather than relying upon the 
testimony of pilots or military audio-visual wizardry. 
The 'scudfest' began, like the war itself had done, on American prime time. 
CBS was quick off the mark when at 19:12 EST on the 17 January, Tom Fenton in Tel 
Aviv reported that a 'huge blast' had been heard in the city. He was telephoning from 
insideasealedroom. Then at 19:23 EST,CNN went over to WolfBlitzeratthePentagon 
who reported the news that the first attacks against Israel had taken place although it was 
unclear whether the missiles were carrying chemical warheads. CNN then went over to 
Alex Claude of JCS Radio in Tel Aviv who gave a live audio report saying that they had 
been told to put their gas masks on. He could hear explosions as he spoke. It was well 
after midnight in Israel on the 18th. For the rest of the night, there was speculation as 
to whether the explosions had been caused by Scud attacks and whether chemicals had 
been used and whether the Israelis would retaliate, although on NBC Martin Fletcher 
was at frrstgiving a much calmer account to Tom Brokaw in which he stated that the frrst 
explosion was not chemical. At 02:33 (local time) CNN carried its first pictures of its 
Jerusalem office where bureau chief Larry Register was seen on the phone in the office 
surrounded by people wearing gas masks. A wobbly shoulder camera enhanced the 
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tension as Register looked nervously out of the windows: 'And I thought I heard the 
explosions about 20 minutes ago'. Crew members donned their gas masks ostentatiously 
before the camera. 'Don't open the window, please', said the anchor as Register put his 
mask on. Register then transmitted his report through the muffled gas mask and 
microphone. At 02:46 on NBC, Martin Fletcher in Tel Aviv joined in when he was 
interviewed wearing his gas mask: 'at least one gas warhead, at least one conventional 
warhead, we know that... we have confirmation that the victims of chemical war have 
been taken to that hospital'. Brokaw replied: 'It is a very bad situation, getting much 
worse moment by moment. It seems to me absolutely unavoidable for the Israelis to stay 
out if that is the case'. Meanwhile, for several hours of dramatic television, CNN's 
cameras were pointing at the wrong place. In fact it was all in a sense a non-event; 
Jerusalem was not attacked. Some 25 miles away Tel Aviv was, but not with chemicals. 
It had certainly not been turned into a 'crematorium', as Baghdad radio maintained. 
Dazzling television this may have been, but what can it tell us about the image 
of war that was presented to audiences via the most pervasive medium of all in this, the 
most high profile media war in history? Of course truth was a major casualty: that is the 
frrstreality of war, especially when so many forces are at work- by military censors, by 
the restrictions on access to information, by the gatekeeping nature of journalism itself 
- to prevent an accurate picture of what was actually happening from reaching the 
audiences in whose name the 30 nation strong coalition was operating on behalf of the 
New World Order. But the sheer scale of the coverage - by more than a thousand 
journalists in Saudi Arabia, by the unique historical presence of western reporters in an 
enemy capital under fire, by 24 hour saturation radio and television coverage -provided 
an illusion of open coverage that detracted attention away from what was not being said 
or done. Only that which was deemed acceptable by the warring partners was permitted 
but, thanks to the presence of western journalists in Baghdad, the illusion was created 
that war was being fought out in full view of a global audience. But the absence of 
cameras in Kuwait or at the Iraqi front line meant that the neither the main reason for 
the war, nor the battlefields where it was mainly won and lost, were being seen. It was 
in the interests and in the power of neither side to let this happen. An old axiom will need 
to be amended in light of the Gulf War. In war in the television age, the frrst casualty 
is context. And although the Gulf War will undoubted! y be remembered as CNN' s war 
or television's war, it was really no such thing. The conflict belonged to the coalition's 
armed forces, and to the victors went the spoils of the information war. 
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